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THE COORDINATION FALLACY 
MICHAEL D. GILBERT & BRIAN BARNES 
ABSTRACT 
 This symposium piece tackles an important issue in campaign finance: the relationship 
between coordinated expenditures and corruption. Only one form of corruption, the quid pro 
quo, is constitutionally significant, and it has three logical elements: (1) an actor, such as an 
individual or corporation, conveys value to a politician, (2) the politician conveys value to 
the actor, and (3) a bargain links the two. Campaign finance regulations aim to deter quid 
pro quos by impeding the first or third element. Limits on contributions, for example, fight 
corruption by capping the value an actor can convey to a politician. What about limits on 
coordinated expenditures? By preventing coordination on large expenditures like television 
ads, the law turns very useful support into less useful support, reducing the value an actor 
can convey. But actors can surmount this with more money: $1 million spent on less useful 
ads can convey a lot of value, often more than smaller amounts spent on very useful ads or 
contributions. Limits on coordination may also inhibit bargaining, the third element of a 
quid pro quo, but again, sophisticated actors can surmount this: they can bargain without 
discussing the substance of any expenditures. So coordination regulations cannot deter 
much corruption, at least not when wealthy and sophisticated actors are involved, the very 
actors who cause the most concern. Consequently, coordination regulations may violate the 
Constitution. This is not because coordinated expenditures do not corrupt but because  
the regulations do not deter. Solving this problem requires more than a broader set of  
regulations. It requires confronting a fallacy at the heart of campaign finance: the belief that 
coordination relates in an operational way to corruption. 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................  399 
 II. BACKGROUND: THE COORDINATION CONTROVERSY ..........................................  402 
 A. Basics of Campaign Finance .....................................................................  403 
 B. Coordination Defined .................................................................................  406 
 C. Controversy and Reform ............................................................................  408 
 III. COORDINATION AND CORRUPTION ....................................................................  411 
 A. Coordination and Quids ............................................................................  413 
 B. Coordination and Pros ...............................................................................  418 
 IV. COORDINATION AND THE CONSTITUTION ..........................................................  420 
 V. CONCLUSION: COORDINATION AS THE WRONG PATH ........................................  423 
I.   INTRODUCTION  
 In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,1 the Supreme 
Court concluded that independent political expenditures do not cause 
quid pro quo corruption.2 Because preventing such corruption is the 
only permissible justification for restricting money in politics,3 the 
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Regulation of the Political Thicket.” 
 1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 357 (“[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures, including those 
made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”). 
 3. See id. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental 
interest in preventing corruption . . . , that interest was limited to quid pro quo 
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Court held that the government cannot limit independent expendi-
tures.4 The case invalidated many rules on political spending, includ-
ing spending by corporations on ads supporting candidates, and 
prompted sharp criticism. Politicians, scholars, and others worried 
that the decision would inject enormous sums into American politics.5 
As President Obama declared, the Court “open[ed] the floodgates for 
special interests . . . to spend without limit in our elections.”6   
 Since the decision, and beneath the cacophonous debate about 
money in politics, a more technical, legal dispute has simmered.  
The government cannot limit independent political expenditures, but 
it can (and does) limit non-independent expenditures—known as  
coordinated expenditures—because those, in the Court’s view, can 
cause corruption. This raises a question: how to distinguish the two?7  
Federal law draws the line by asking if the politician directed the  
expenditure, either by requesting it or dictating its content.8 If the 
answer is yes, then the expenditure was coordinated.  
 Critics claim that this approach opens a loophole.9 To illustrate, 
suppose the owner of an oil company gives money to a super PAC run 
                                                                                                                                       
corruption.”); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (“Any regulation must 
instead target what we have called ‘quid pro quo’ corruption or its appearance.”). 
 4. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356-61. 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 454 (“Corporations . . . have vastly more money with which to try to 
buy access and votes.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign 
Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2012) (“When . . . independent expenditures can be 
made without restriction in very large amounts, the risk of corruption may even be greater 
than the risk from capped contributions.”); Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, Campaign 
Finance: Remedies Beyond the Court, 27 DEMOCRACY J., Winter 2013, at 38, 38 (“The 
immediate impact of Citizens United and subsequent cases was a dramatic increase in the 
amount that outside groups . . . could raise and spend in federal elections.”); John McCain 
Blasts Citizens United Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 12, 2012, 8:35 AM) (quoting John 
McCain), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/12/john-mccain-citizens-united-super-pac_ 
n_1201425.html (“I predict to you that there will be huge scandals associated with this 
huge flood of money.”).  
 6. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President in State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-state-union-address).   
 7. See DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY: OUTSIDE 
SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 63 (2014) (“Without a doubt, the questions about 
the current landscape that prompted the most animated responses concerned coordination 
between campaigns and outside groups. . . . The challenge in this critical area of campaign 
finance law is to grapple with the gap between the line the law draws and the line outside 
observers expect it to draw.”); see also Eliza Newlin Carney, The Citizens United Ruling in 
the Real World, NAT’L J. (Jan. 25, 2010) (“The biggest unanswered question is what defines 
coordination between a corporation, union or other political player and a candidate.”).  
 8. We discuss federal law in detail infra Section II.B.  
 9. See, e.g., Brief of United States Senators Sheldon Whitehouse & John McCain as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 
2490 (2012) (No. 11-1179) (“[S]uper PACs are coordinating with campaigns, and they are 
using methods the Court did not contemplate in its Citizens United decision.”); Sam Stein, 
Obama Will Appear at Two Super PAC Events, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2014, 11:59 
AM) (quoting David Donnelly, executive director of the Public Campaign Action Fund), 
2016]  THE COORDINATION FALLACY 401 
 
 
by a politician’s friend. The super PAC then uses the money to air 
television ads supporting the politician. Neither the company owner 
nor the friend consulted the politician, and so the politician did not 
direct the expenditure, and that makes the expenditure independent. 
But because the friend knows the politician and his electoral strate-
gy, the expenditure benefits the politician as much as a coordinated 
ad—and can corrupt like one (think favorable oil regulations). This 
means politicians and their benefactors can coordinate as a matter of 
fact without coordinating as a matter of law. As one observer put it, 
“noncoordination is a joke.”10 
 Prominent voices have called for reform, advocating new and 
stricter approaches to regulating coordination.11 Their proposals as-
sume that the concept of coordination makes sense; it just needs 
broader reach. In other words, they accept that “whole, total, true” 
independence of expenditures and candidates would stymie corrup-
tion, just as the Supreme Court has said,12 but they argue that exist-
ing coordination rules fail to achieve that level of independence. 
 We believe this reasoning is faulty. Quid pro quo corruption has 
three necessary elements: (1) a conveyance of value from an individ-
ual to a politician, (2) a conveyance of value from a politician to  
an individual, and (3) a bargain linking the two. By putting distance 
between individuals and politicians, coordination rules can make it 
harder for the former to determine what would be very valuable  
to the latter (perhaps a television ad during primetime) and what 
would be only a little bit valuable (perhaps a radio spot about the  
environment). This distance decreases the effectiveness of individu-
als’ expenditures (they may run the radio spot), which reduces the 
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/13/obama-super-pacs_n_4958485.html (“Right now 
our campaign finance system is more loophole than law, and nowhere is that more 
apparent than what constitutes ‘coordination’ . . . .”); see also Richard Briffault, 
Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 93-94 (2013) (observing that 
coordination rules “reflect naïve thinking about the way a candidate . . . and a supportive 
organization can coordinate” given the modern ease of communicating ideas through the 
press and social media); Richard Posner, Unlimited Campaign Spending – A Good Thing?, 
BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Apr. 8, 2012), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/04/ 
unlimited-campaign-spendinga-good-thing-posner.html (pointing out that allies of a 
candidate can figure out what will be most helpful to the candidate “without even talking 
to the candidate or to party officials”). 
 10. Kyle Langvardt, The Sorry Case for Citizens United: Remarks at the 2012 
Charleston Law Review and Riley Institute of Law and Society Symposium, 6 CHARLESTON 
L. REV. 569, 574 (2012); see also Potter & Morgan, supra note 5, at 40 (“FEC regulations 
that govern whether a group is considered to ‘coordinate’ its expenditures with a candidate 
or political party are so permissive that they have proven more apt as a source of comedic 
inspiration than anything else.”); The Editorial Bd., Editorial, The Line at the ‘Super PAC’ 
Trough, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/opinion/sunday/ 
the-line-at-the-super-pac-trough.html (calling single-candidate super PACs “a form of 
legalized bribery” and calling the prohibition on their contact with candidates “a joke”). 
 11. See infra Section II.C.   
 12. See Potter & Morgan, supra note 5, at 40.   
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value conveyed. In theory, this should deter corruption by stifling the 
first element of quid pro quo corruption—the value conveyed to the 
politician. In practice, however, deterrence is limited because one can 
offset a drop in effectiveness with more money. Spending $1 million 
on a somewhat effective ad can convey a lot of value, more than a 
smaller amount spent on a very effective ad. Alternatively, coordina-
tion rules, by putting distance between individuals and politicians, 
can make it harder for them to communicate and negotiate. In theo-
ry, this should deter corruption by stifling the third element of quid 
pro quo corruption—the bargain. But again, this fails in practice.  
Coordination rules do not target bargaining effectively, and it is not 
clear that they could.  
 These observations lead us to a tentative conclusion: coordination 
rules simply cannot deter much corruption, at least not when 
wealthy and sophisticated actors—the very actors who cause the 
most concern—are involved. As a result, coordination rules may vio-
late the Constitution. This is not because coordinated expenditures 
do not corrupt but because the coordination rules do not deter. They 
interfere with political speech without combating much corruption.  
 This problem cannot be resolved with a broader set of regulations, 
or even with a broader definition of corruption. Instead, it requires 
confronting a fallacy of the Supreme Court’s making at the heart of 
campaign finance: the belief that coordination relates in an opera-
tional way to corruption. 
II.   BACKGROUND: THE COORDINATION CONTROVERSY 
 Corruption comes in many forms,13 but only one, according to to-
day’s Supreme Court, has constitutional significance: the quid pro 
quo.14 The quid pro quo—in a typical case, money for votes—has a 
long history in American politics. George Washington bought votes 
with liquor,15 and Spiro Agnew accepted hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in bribes.16 More recently, Congressman Randy Cunningham 
                                                                                                                                       
 13. See generally Yasmin Dawood, Classifying Corruption, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 103 (2014). 
 14. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (“Any regulation must 
instead target what we have called ‘quid pro quo’ corruption or its appearance.”); Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that 
interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”).  
 15. See TRACY CAMPBELL, DELIVER THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF ELECTION FRAUD, AN 
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION—1742-2004, at 5 (2005).   
 16. Ten Most Corrupt Politicians, REALCLEARPOLITICS (Jan. 28, 2009, 4:04 PM), 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/lists/most_corrupt_politicians/spiro-agnew.html.  
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traded defense contracts for a Rolls Royce, 17  and the FBI found 
$90,000 of dirty money in Congressman William Jefferson’s freezer.18  
 Federal bribery law prohibits quid pro quo corruption,19 but many 
consider that insufficient on its own because the crime is difficult  
to prove. As the Supreme Court wrote in Buckley, bribery laws “deal 
with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money 
to influence governmental action.”20 Congress has responded to this 
problem with campaign finance regulations, which serve as “prophy-
lactic controls,” meaning they do not punish corruption ex post but 
aim to prevent it ex ante.21 They do so by limiting the flow of corrup-
tive money to politicians. Of course, they also limit the flow of un-
corruptive money, meaning they prevent some lawful political 
speech.22 The Court in Citizens United gestured to the tradeoff when 
it stated that contribution limits “are preventative, because few if any 
contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements.”23 
 Recognizing that Congress designs campaign finance regulations 
to act as prophylactics sharpens the analysis. Before explaining why, 
we examine some other legal details.  
A.   Basics of Campaign Finance 
 The law distinguishes contributions and expenditures. In brief, a 
contribution refers to money given to a campaign,24 while an expendi-
ture refers to other money spent to influence an election.25 The law 
divides expenditures into two types, independent and coordinated. 
                                                                                                                                       
 17. See Charles R. Babcock & Jonathan Weisman, Congressman Admits Taking 
Bribes, Resigns, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/28/AR2005112801827.html.  
 18. See John Bresnahan, William Jefferson Convicted in Freezer Cash Case, 
POLITICO (Aug. 5, 2009, 6:03 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0809/25850.html.  
 19. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (Supp. I 2012) (The statute applies to whoever “directly or 
indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value” to a public official with 
intent to influence an official act, or to a public official who “directly or indirectly, corruptly 
demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value” in 
return for being influenced regarding an official act.). 
 20. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (per curiam). 
 21. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1458 (2014) (“It is worth keeping in 
mind that the base [contribution] limits themselves are a prophylactic measure.”). The 
prophylactic nature of the regulations may make these types of offenses easier to prove by 
describing them in relatively broad terms. 
 22. Of the speech that gets limited, the relative shares of corruptive and un-corruptive 
speech depend, of course, on one’s definition of corruption.  
 23. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).  
 24. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8) (Supp. II 2014); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.51-100.57 (2015); FEC, 
Citizens’ Guide, at 4-7 (2014), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/citizens_guide_brochure.pdf. 
 25. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9) (Supp. II 2014); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.110-100.114 (2015); 
Kang, supra note 5, at 5 n.11. To illustrate, donating $2000 to a candidate would constitute 
a contribution, and spending $2000 on a newspaper ad supporting the candidate would 
constitute an expenditure.  
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The next Section examines this distinction, but for now an example 
will suffice. If an individual runs a newspaper ad without any input 
from the politician it supports, then that individual makes an inde-
pendent expenditure. If an individual runs the ad at the request of 
the politician, or if the politician dictates the ad’s content, then the 
individual makes a coordinated expenditure.  
 Congress has long imposed limits on both contributions and  
expenditures,26 and litigants have long challenged those limits on 
constitutional grounds.27 The government has defended the limits by 
arguing that it has an interest in combating corruption.28 In general, 
the Supreme Court has sided with the government on contributions29 
and coordinated expenditures30 and the challengers on independent 
expenditures.31  
 What explains the Court’s decisions? The answer lies in its under-
standing of corruption.32 The Court has recognized that states have 
an interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corrup-
tion, 33  where “corruption” means quid pro quos. 34  Contributions, 
which involve the direct conveyance of money to campaigns, raise a 
                                                                                                                                       
 26. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444-45 (reciting the Buckley Court’s 
evaluation of “the constitutionality of the original contribution and expenditure limits set 
forth in FECA”).  
 27. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). The Supreme Court 
sympathizes with challengers’ claims, stating in Buckley: “[C]ontribution and expenditure 
limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities.”  
Id. at 14.  
 28. See, e.g., id. at 26-27. 
 29. See id. at 26-27, 29 (upholding contribution limits); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 395 (2000) (same). But see McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462 (invalidating 
federal aggregate contribution limits); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236-37 (2006) 
(invalidating Vermont’s individual contribution limits).  
 30. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356-58 (2010); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 
(“The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure . . . alleviates the 
danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo . . . .”).  
 31. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (invalidating limits on independent expenditures); 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 (same).  
 32. It also lies in the Court’s conclusion that independent expenditures are a purer 
form of political speech and merit greater protection. The Buckley Court “explained that 
expenditure limits ‘represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on  
the quantity and diversity of political speech,’ while contribution limits ‘entai[l] only a 
marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.’ ” Nix-
on, 528 U.S. at 413 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 20-21).  
 33. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345 (“The Buckley Court recognized a ‘sufficiently 
important’ governmental interest in ‘the prevention of corruption and the appearance of 
corruption.’ ” (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25)). We focus on actual corruption but briefly 
address the appearance of corruption infra, Part IV. 
 34. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently 
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, 
that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”).  
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substantial risk of quid pro quo corruption.35 Likewise with coordi-
nated expenditures, which, because of the coordination, can 
“amount[] to disguised contributions.”36 In contrast, independent ex-
penditures do not have such potential for corruption.37 As the Court 
wrote in Buckley: 
Unlike contributions [and coordinated expenditures], such inde-
pendent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the 
candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. 
The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expendi-
ture with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value 
of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger 
that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper 
commitments from the candidate.38  
 The Court doubled down on this reasoning in Citizens United. 
There the Court declared that “independent expenditures . . . do not 
give rise to corruption.”39 Because such expenditures do not corrupt, 
the government cannot limit them on anti-corruption grounds. 40 
Hence the state of the law today: limits on contributions and coordi-
nated expenditures exist at the federal level and in many states, but 
                                                                                                                                       
 35. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014) (“[T]he risk of corruption 
arises when an individual makes large contributions to the candidate or officeholder 
himself.”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (“[A] candidate lacking immense . . . wealth must 
depend on financial contributions . . . . To the extent that large contributions are given to 
secure a political quid pro quo . . . the integrity of our system of representative democracy 
is undermined.”). 
 36. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.  
 37. The Court’s view of the corruptive value of these forms of speech is intertwined 
with its view of their expressive value. Professor Ortiz describes the “dual hydraulics” at 
work in this area, “a hydraulics of expression . . . and a hydraulics of influence.” Daniel R. 
Ortiz, Commentary, Water, Water Everywhere, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1739, 1744 (1999). The shift 
from contributions to independent expenditures represents an “increasingly less efficient 
means of influence,” while “the Court believes the hydraulic efficiency of expression works 
in the opposite direction.” Id. at 1745. 
 38. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.  
 39. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. Many people reject this conclusion. See, e.g., W. 
Tradition P’ship v. Attorney Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 1, 35 (Mont. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Am. 
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (“I absolutely do not agree that 
corporate money in the form of ‘independent expenditures’ . . . cannot give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.”) (Nelson, J., dissenting); Briffault, supra note 
9, at 100 (“The Supreme Court’s insistence that independent spending does not pose 
dangers of corruption or the appearance of corruption has been doubtful from the 
start . . . .”); Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 
123 YALE L.J. 412, 417 (2013) (“I find the majority’s sunny dismissal of the corrupting 
influence of independent expenditures wholly unpersuasive.”). 
 40. Some believe the Court’s conclusion is legal rather than factual, rendering 
empirical evidence moot. See Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States 
Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 360-61 
(2014) (“[T]he Court admitted that it did not care whether independent expenditures 
actually corrupt the political process because, in the Court’s eyes, independent 
expenditures cannot corrupt as a matter of law, any evidence to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”).  
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limits on independent expenditures—whether by individuals or cor-
porations—do not and cannot exist because they violate the First 
Amendment.41  
 This overview uncovers a tension. Many actors spending money  
on elections prefer to make independent expenditures, as they are 
unlimited. But they also like to coordinate, as that increases the  
value of their spending to the politicians they support (they run the 
primetime television ad and not the radio spot). This tension has  
led to expenditures that toe the line between independent and coor-
dinated and focused attention on where that line falls.    
B.   Coordination Defined  
 What counts as coordination?42 The question has “long stymied 
Congress and the FEC”43 and just about everyone else.44 Part of the 
problem is that the question has two parts. The first involves the 
Constitution. Following Citizens United, Congress can limit only one 
type of expenditure, a coordinated one. The constitutional question, 
then, is: what counts as coordinated for purposes of determining the 
scope of congressional authority?45 The second part involves existing 
federal regulations: assuming they are constitutional, what exactly 
do they mean? We focus on the second part, but eventually we will 
return to the first.  
 The Code of Federal Regulations defines a coordinated expendi-
ture as one “made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at 
the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's authorized 
                                                                                                                                       
 41. Limits on independent expenditures do exist in some narrow cases. See, e.g., 52 
U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(C) (Supp. II 2014) (prohibiting independent expenditures by foreign 
nationals); see also Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 
1087 (2012) (rejecting a challenge to the ban on expenditures by foreign nationals). 
 42. We focus on current law. For a brief and helpful overview of the development of 
the law on coordination, see Meredith A. Johnston, Note, Stopping “Winks and Nods”: 
Limits on Coordination as a Means of Regulating 527 Organizations, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1166, 1175-79 (2006).   
 43. Carney, supra note 7.  
 44. See Bradley A. Smith, Super PACs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign 
Finance Law, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 603, 606 (2013) (“There is, indeed, a great deal of 
confusion about what coordination prohibits and why.”); Posner, supra note 9 (observing 
that “the notion of ‘coordination’ is vague”).  
 45. We await an answer from the Supreme Court. See O’Keefe v. Chisholm, 769 F.3d 
936, 941 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court has yet to determine what ‘coordination’ 
means. Is the scope of permissible regulation limited to groups that advocate the election of 
particular candidates, or can government also regulate coordination of contributions and 
speech about political issues, when the speakers do not expressly advocate any person’s 
election? What if the speech implies, rather than expresses, a preference for a particular 
candidate’s election? If regulation of coordination about pure issue advocacy is permissible, 
how tight must the link be between the politician’s committee and the advocacy group?”).  
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committee, or a political party committee.”46 The FEC operationalizes 
this definition with a three-prong test: payment, content, and con-
duct.47 The “conduct” prong, which is the source of controversy,48 in-
volves the relationship between spender and candidate. 
 The FEC identifies five situations that, individually or together, 
satisfy the conduct prong. 49 We summarize them. Consistent with 
the FEC, we refer to the expenditure in question as a communication.   
1. The communication is created, produced, or distributed at the 
request or suggestion of the candidate.  
2. The candidate is materially involved in decisions about a  
communication’s content, intended audience, specific media outlet, 
timing, frequency, size, prominence, or duration.  
3. The communication is created after substantial discussions 
about the communication between the actor funding it and the 
candidate.50  
4. The actor funding the communication hires a commercial  
vendor (i.e., pollster or media consultant) who provided services to  
the candidate in the prior 120 days, and the vendor either uses or 
conveys to the actor information about the campaign material to 
the communication. 
5. A person who worked for the candidate’s campaign in the prior 
120 days conveys information about the plans or needs of the  
candidate to the actor funding the communication that are materi-
al to the communication.  
                                                                                                                                       
 46. 11 C.F.R. § 109.20 (2015); see § 109.21 (defining “coordinated communication”); 
TREVOR POTTER & MATTHEW T. SANDERSON, POLITICAL ACTIVITY, LOBBYING LAWS & GIFTS 
RULES GUIDE, 3D § 10:19, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2014); cf. 52  
U.S.C. § 30101(17) (Supp. II 2014) (defining an independent expenditure as one that is “not 
made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the 
candidate’s authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee 
or its agents”). 
 47. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a) (2015); FEC, COORDINATED COMMUNICATIONS AND 
INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES 2-3 (2015), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ie_brochure.pdf. 
The first prong addresses payment: the expenditure must be funded by someone “other than 
a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, a political party committee or an agent of 
the above.” Id. at 3; see 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a)(1) (2015). The second prong addresses 
content: “[T]he expenditure must be either express advocacy, an electioneering 
communication, or the republication of the candidate’s own materials.” Briffault, supra 
note 9, at 96 n.47. 
 48. Briffault, supra note 9, at 96 n.47 (“The real issue for single-candidate Super 
PACs is the conduct standard.”). 
 49. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(1)-(5) (2015); FEC, supra note 47, at 3-4. 
 50. “A discussion is ‘substantial’ if information about the candidate’s or political party 
committee’s campaign plans, projects, activities, or needs is conveyed to a person paying for 
the communication, and that information is material to the creation, production, or distri-
bution of the communication.” FEC, supra note 47, at 4 n.3; see 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(3) 
(2015). 
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 The FEC qualifies these situations in two ways.51 First, “agree-
ment or formal collaboration between the person paying for the  
communication and the candidate . . . is not required” to satisfy the 
conduct prong.52 Second, except for when the candidate requests an 
expenditure (situation number one above), the conduct prong is not 
satisfied if the communication relies only on publicly available  
information.53   
 An example may clarify.54 If an individual runs a newspaper ad 
without any interaction with or input from the candidate, then that 
constitutes an independent expenditure. That is true even if the ad 
includes a photo taken by the candidate’s staff, as long as the photo 
was publicly available. If the candidate requested or dictated the  
content of the ad, even without a formal agreement, then the ad  
constitutes a coordinated expenditure.  
C.   Controversy and Reform 
 In the newspaper example, the law may resonate with intuitions. 
The independent ad probably has less corruptive potential than the 
coordinated one, so it may seem sensible to impose limits only on the 
latter. But now consider the scenario from the introduction. An oil 
baron gives money to a super PAC run by a politician’s friend who, 
up until 121 days ago, worked for the politician. The super PAC runs 
a supportive ad. The politician did not request the ad, nor did she 
have any input on it, so the ad is not a coordinated expenditure. But 
because the friend knows the politician and her strategy, the ad  
benefits the politician like a coordinated expenditure. Now the law 
clashes with intuitions. The actual ad has the same corruptive poten-
tial as a coordinated ad, but the law classifies it as an independent 
expenditure that, according to the Supreme Court, does not and can-
not corrupt.   
 This scenario is hypothetical, but it captures the flavor of real 
events. During the 2012 presidential election, Mitt Romney and top 
advisors to Barack Obama appeared at fundraisers for supportive 
super PACs.55 Those super PACs were run by former aids to those 
                                                                                                                                       
 51. The FEC has other qualifications and safe harbors as well, see FEC, supra note 
47, at 4-7, but we only mention those most relevant to this paper.  
 52. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(e) (2015); see FEC, supra note 47, at 4.  
 53. FEC, supra note 47, at 5. 
 54. All examples assume that the payment and content prongs of the FEC’s test are 
satisfied. The action, as is the case in reality, involves prong three: conduct.  
 55. See Alexander Burns, Mitt Romney Addressing Super PAC Fundraisers, POLITICO 
(July 28, 2011, 12:35 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0711/60143.html; Michael 
Luo & Nicholas Confessore, Top Obama Adviser to Appear at ‘Super PAC’ Meeting, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2012, 6:37 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/top-obama-
adviser-to-appear-at-super-pac-meeting/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=2. Also, note that in 
2014 President Obama himself appeared at events organized by pro-Democratic super 
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candidates.56 In 2010, the National Republican Congressional Com-
mittee publicly revealed its ad buy strategy, allowing outside groups 
to fill gaps in the schedule.57 Recently, politicians used anonymous 
Twitter accounts to provide polling information to outside groups 
running ads. 58  In 2012, the independent group supporting Jon 
Huntsman raised $2.8 million, $1.9 million of which came from 
Huntsman’s father.59 Similarly, Space PAC, which supported Con-
gressional candidate Gabriel Rothblatt, raised $225,000, all of it from 
Rothblatt’s parent.60 Rothblatt claimed that he had “taken pains” not 
to communicate with his parent, stating, “You don’t want to, in a 
casual conversation, cross a [coordination] line that can turn around 
and bite you.”61 A recent report concluded that hundreds of millions 
of dollars spent by outside groups in 2012 involved a “high degree of 
cooperation” between candidates and those groups.62  
 These activities and spending do not run afoul of the coordination 
limits. 63  The candidates (apparently) have not requested expendi-
tures, nor (apparently) have they provided input on them. This leaves 
many observers incredulous.64 They argue that candidates and out-
                                                                                                                                       
PACs, not to fundraise directly but to “draw an audience to their cause.” See Stein, supra 
note 9.   
 56. See Fredreka Schouten, Super PACs, Candidates Blur Lines Ahead of Nov. 6, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:22 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-
02-29/super-pac-candidates-coordination/53307020/1.   
 57. See Jeanne Cummings, GOP Groups Coordinated Spending, POLITICO (Nov. 3, 
2010, 12:54 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44651.html.  
 58. See Chris Moody, How the GOP Used Twitter to Stretch Election Laws, CNN (Nov. 
17, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/17/politics/twitter-republicans-outside-
groups/.  
 59. See Nicholas Confessore, Huntsman’s Father Gave $1.9 Million to Super PAC, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 31, 2012, 11:44 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/ 
huntsman-sr-gave-1-9-million-to-pro-huntsman-super-pac/.  
 60. See The Editorial Bd., Editorial, The Custom-Made ‘Super PAC’, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 3, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/opinion/the-custom-made-super-pac-.html?_r=2.   
 61. Fredreka Schouten & Christopher Schnaars, Some Candidates’ Super PACs Are a 
Family Affair, USA TODAY (July 18, 2014, 11:23 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
nation/2014/07/18/relatives-fund-candidate-super-pacs-rothblatt/12824361/.  
 62. TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 7, at 2.  
 63. The practice of posting polling information via anonymous Twitter accounts may 
be an exception. See Moody, supra note 58 (noting that the practice “raises questions about 
whether [Republicans and outside groups] violated campaign finance laws that prohibit 
coordination”). 
 64. See Bob Bauer, Coordinating with a Super PAC, Raising Money for It, and the 
Difference Between the Two, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2014/01/coordinating-super-pac-raising-money-
difference-two/. Bauer explains:  
 To many unhappy observers of the state of contemporary campaign finance 
doctrine, the latitude of the Super PAC to operate with the support of allies of 
the candidate, former staff and friends, and to benefit from the candidate’s 
endorsement or fundraising, seems intolerably silly. So they say that the 
committee having this connection to the candidate cannot be “truly” 
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side groups routinely coordinate—and may corrupt—as a matter of 
fact, even if they do not coordinate as a matter of law.65 As Senator 
Kent Conrad stated, “[T]his whole idea well, oh, they don’t coordi-
nate, therefore it’s really independent is just nonsense.”66 
 Many observers have advocated reforms. Professor Richard 
Briffault argues that expenditures by groups who focus their support 
on only one candidate or a very small number of candidates and who 
have tight links to the candidate(s) should be considered coordinat-
ed. 67  The American Anti-Corruption Act, drafted by former FEC 
Chairman Trevor Potter and promoted by Professor Larry Lessig, 
would broaden coordination rules.68 Minnesota’s Campaign Finance 
and Public Disclosure Board has concluded that candidates cannot 
solicit funds for supportive super PACs without crossing the coordi-
nation line.69 The list goes on.70    
                                                                                                                                       
independent. In Buckley’s terms, though, it is, and any complaints should be 
directed there.  
Id. 
 65. For example, in response to an assertion about Space PAC’s independence, the 
Editorial Board of the New York Times wrote, “Sorry, but that’s preposterous.” The 
Editorial Bd., supra note 60; see also Brief of United States Senators Sheldon  
Whitehouse & John McCain as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Am. 
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (No. 11-1179) (“In sum, super PACs are 
coordinating with campaigns, and they are using methods the Court did not contemplate in 
its Citizens United decision.”); TAYLOR LINCOLN, PUBLIC CITIZEN, SUPER CONNECTED 13 
(2013), http://www.citizen.org/documents/super-connected-march-2013-update-candidate-
super-pacs-not-independent-report.pdf (“There is a possibility (as was shown in the 2012 
elections) for expenditures that are legally categorized as ‘independent’ to be other than 
independent in practice.”); Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1681 
(2012) (describing several ways that a candidate and a candidate-specific Super PAC can 
“establish a successful working relationship without formal coordination”); Langvardt, 
supra note 10, at 574 (“Everybody knows the big super PACs coordinate with candidates.”); 
The Editorial Bd., Editorial, A Trickle-Down Effect of Citizens United, N.Y. TIMES  
(Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/14/opinion/a-trickle-down-effect-of-
citizens-united.html (“The Supreme Court’s central rationale for allowing unlimited 
independent spending in support of a candidate is based on the unrealistic notion that the 
money and the candidate’s campaign are, in fact, separate.”); Anna Palmer & Jim 
VandeHei, A New Way to Buy Real Influence, POLITICO (Oct. 24, 2011, 4:37 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/66673.html (“[A]s Rep. Tom Cole (R-Okla.) 
explained, the distance between outside groups and candidates is mostly on paper.”).  
 66. TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 7, at 65. 
 67. See Briffault, supra note 9, at 97-98. This position is one aspect of Professor 
Briffault’s thoughtful proposal. Interested readers should consult Coordination 
Reconsidered for the full proposal.  
 68. See THE AMERICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION ACT (2015), https://represent.us/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/AACA-Full-Provisions.pdf; Briffault, supra note 9, at 97 n.50 
(“The American Anti-Corruption Act . . . presents a similar, albeit somewhat broader, 
proposal for redefining coordination.”); cf. Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, 
Corruption, and the Proxy War over Coordination, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 15-
21 (2014) (examining and critiquing the proposals by Briffault, Potter, and Lessig, and 
arguing that some of the proposals might be unconstitutional).  
 69. See Caleb P. Burns & Eric Wang, Minnesota Campaign Finance Board Adopts 
Stricter Position on Super PAC Coordination, WILEY REIN LLP (Mar. 2014), 
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 These proposals assume that the theory of coordination makes 
sense, it just needs broader reach. In other words, they assume that 
classifying more expenditures as coordinated, and therefore limited 
by law, would combat quid pro quo corruption. For that logic to hold, 
coordination and corruption must be meaningfully linked. But are they?  
III.   COORDINATION AND CORRUPTION 
 Consider again the three necessary, logical elements of quid pro 
quo corruption.71 First, an actor must convey value to a politician (the 
“quid”). The value could come in many forms, including a campaign 
contribution, a briefcase full of cash, or a favor. Second, the politician 
must convey value to the actor (the “quo”). This could include a vote 
on favorable legislation, a helpful call to a regulator, assistance pro-
moting the actor’s product,72 and so forth. Third, a bargain must link 
the two (the “pro”). The actor’s conveyance must cause the politician’s 
conveyance and vice versa. The money buys the vote, and the vote 
buys the money. 
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item-4912.html; see also Bob Bauer, 
Minnesota on Candidate Fundraising for Independent Committees: Round Two and Still Struggling, 
MORE SOFT MONEY HARD LAW (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/ 
2014/02/minnesota-candidate-fundraising-independent-committees-round-two-still-struggling/.   
 70. See Brent Ferguson, Beyond Coordination: Defining Indirect Campaign 
Contributions for the Super PAC Era, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 471, 509-10 (2015) 
(proposing a candidate-action theory for limiting “indirect contributions,” in which “an 
expenditure may be treated as a contribution if there are reliable indications . . . that an 
expenditure will provide sufficient utility or perceived utility to a candidate such that quid 
pro quo corruption becomes a strong concern”); Note, Working Together for an Independent 
Expenditure: Candidate Assistance with Super PAC Fundraising, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1478, 
1480 (2015) (proposing a redefinition of coordination “to include candidate-assisted Super 
PAC fundraising activities”); The Editorial Bd., supra note 10 (calling the Empowering 
Citizens Act “the best chance for ridding politics of special-interest cash and preventing 
another era of scandal”); Paul S. Ryan, Commentary, New Report Highlights Need for 
“Coordination” Reform Post-Citizens United, ROLL CALL (June 18, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/new_report_highlights_need_for_coordination_reform_post_ 
citizens_united-233970-1.html?pg=2&dczone=opinion (“It is time for the FEC to tighten up 
its ‘coordination’ regulations—to bring the legal definition of coordination in better 
alignment with the common sense meaning of the word.”); Summary of H.R. 270, the 
Empowering Citizens Act, DEMOCRACY 21 (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.democracy21.org/ppf-
notes/press-releases-ppf-notes/a-summary-of-h-r-6448-the-empowering-citizens-act-2/ 
(describing an act that would, among other things, propose “to strengthen and override the 
ineffectual coordination regulations adopted by the FEC”). 
 71. These elements are necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, for quid pro quo 
corruption. Federal bribery law requires proof of another element: the exchange of value 
between an actor and a candidate must be “corrupt,” where the meaning of corrupt is not 
clear. See Eric J. Tamashasky, The Lewis Carroll Offense: The Ever-Changing Meaning of 
“Corruptly” Within the Federal Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGIS. 129, 129-30, 139-41 (2004) 
(describing the use of the term “corruptly” in 18 U.S.C. § 201 and other statutes). This 
element is irrelevant for our purposes. 
 72. See, e.g., Katie Glueck, McDonnells Convicted of Corruption, POLITICO (Sept. 4, 
2014, 11:02 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/bob-mcdonnell-trial-verdict-110602. 
html (describing former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell’s conviction for corrupt practices 
around the promotion of a dietary supplement).  
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  Bribery laws punish the satisfaction of these elements: if they are 
met (or attempted), then the actor and politician go to prison.73 Cam-
paign finance regulations impede the satisfaction of these elements. 
This follows from their prophylactic character. The regulations do not 
punish the crime of bribery but aim to prevent it by blocking one or 
more steps necessary for its consummation. 
 To illustrate, consider limits on campaign contributions. They do 
not impede politicians from conveying value to contributors, nor do 
they make it harder for individuals and politicians to bargain.74 Con-
tribution limits do not address these activities (the quo and the pro) 
in any way. Instead, they limit the value contributors can convey to 
politicians. By prohibiting donations beyond a certain size—no big 
quid—they frustrate corruption.  
 Now consider limits on coordinated expenditures. They do not  
impede politicians from casting favorable votes, awarding lucrative 
contracts, making helpful calls, employing supporters’ relatives, or 
promoting products. Nor could they impede most of these activities, 
as most are fundamental to politicians’ jobs. The limits do deter poli-
ticians from providing direct input on expenditures. However, that 
involvement is not independently valuable to the makers of those  
expenditures in the corruption context. For bad actors, using politi-
cians’ input to increase the effectiveness of their expenditures is just 
a means to an end. It seems clear, then, that limits on coordinated 
expenditures do not aim to prevent corruption by limiting the value 
that politicians can convey. 
 If the limits do not target the quo, they must target the quid or the 
pro. The Supreme Court thinks they do both. Recall Buckley, where 
the Court wrote, “The absence of . . . coordination of an expendi-
ture . . . undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate.”75 
This implies that a coordinated expenditure conveys value. Limits on 
coordinated expenditures then, like limits on contributions, limit 
quids. The Court also wrote that the absence of coordination “allevi-
                                                                                                                                       
 73. Satisfaction of any one of the three elements may result in a violation of the 
federal bribery statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). 
 74. Professor Brad Smith concludes otherwise, or at least he understands the 
Supreme Court to conclude otherwise. He states that “corruption is in the bargain” and 
contributions “are by definition coordinated with the candidate.” Smith, supra note 44, at 
618. Limits on such contributions, then, are justified as a method for “limiting contact 
between speakers and the candidate or his agents.” Id. at 619. We respectfully disagree. 
Most contributions, particularly in the Internet age, come with no contact whatsoever 
between donor and candidate. More importantly, contribution limits do not and cannot 
impede bargaining because they are easily sidestepped. A corrupt donor can, without 
violating the limits, contribute $1 every day, each time meeting with the candidate to 
bargain. Alternatively, a corrupt donor can make a single, lawful contribution today and 
meet with the politician every day thereafter to bargain. Indeed, a donor and politician can 
meet any time they wish, and contribution limits do not and cannot prevent that.   
 75. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam).  
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ates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo  
for improper commitments from the candidate.”76 This implies that 
coordination facilitates bargaining—the pro—and limits on coordina-
tion prevent it. We consider these possibilities in turn. Before doing 
so, we note that discussions of coordination often blur the line  
between value (quid) and bargain (pro).77 Part of our objective is to 
sharpen that line. Doing so clarifies the theory behind coordination 
and its weaknesses.  
A.   Coordination and Quids 
 In general, politicians have better information about their cam-
paigns than outsiders, meaning they can spend money in support of 
their campaigns more efficiently. This makes contributions especially 
valuable, as politicians can use them to maximal effect. So, too, with 
coordinated expenditures, which politicians can direct or influence to 
suit their needs. This explains why contributions and coordinated 
expenditures can act as quids—they convey value to politicians—and 
why campaign finance law limits them. Now consider independent 
expenditures. Without input from the relevant politician, who has 
superior information, such expenditures will be less effective. 78  A 
                                                                                                                                       
 76. Id. (emphasis omitted).  
 77. For example, Hasen seems to offer a value theory, observing that a “candidate who 
raises funds for a group by definition is coordinating fundraising strategy with that group; 
the candidate is taking time to raise funds for the group rather than for his campaign.” 
Hasen, supra note 68, at 20. Presumably, the candidate is raising funds for the group 
because he expects the group’s expenditures to convey value to him. Ferguson also focuses 
on value and would allow expenditures to be treated as contributions if there are “reliable 
indications” that the “expenditure will provide sufficient utility or perceived utility to a 
candidate such that quid pro quo corruption becomes a strong concern.” Ferguson, supra 
note 70, at 510. But Ferguson also notes that his approach would leave the spender free to 
make any expenditure “as long as it does not collaborate with the candidate,” which 
suggests some focus on bargaining. Id. at 519 n.231. Smith, interpreting Buckley, offers a 
bargain theory, stating that “corruption is in the bargain.” Smith, supra note 44, at 618; see 
also Thomas R. McCoy, Understanding McConnell v. FEC and Its Implications for the 
Constitutional Protection of Corporate Speech, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1043, 1052 (2005) (“[A] 
restriction on coordinated expenditures . . . must be understood not as a restriction on the 
expenditures, but rather as a restriction on the action of ‘coordinating’ the speech with the 
candidate . . . .”). Bauer seems to focus on both value and coordination. See Bauer, supra 
note 64 (arguing that for an interaction between speaker and candidate to constitute 
coordination, it “must involve a matter of strategic significance . . . the core organizational 
strategy for persuading voters.”). Briffault seems to focus on value. See Briffault, supra 
note 9, at 91, 94 (arguing that single-candidate super PACs are essentially “alter egos for 
the official campaign committees of the candidates whom they exist[] to serve” and thus it 
is “unnecessary to establish coordination,” which we interpret to mean that value is 
conveyed even absent a bargain). Hasen criticizes Briffault’s analysis for “apparently 
conflat[ing] coordination with common purpose.” Hasen, supra note 68, at 19. 
 78. The Court’s analysis assumes that independent expenditures often do not convey 
much value and may even take away value. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (“Unlike 
contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the 
candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.”); Bauer, supra note 64 
(“Hence the difference between the contribution and the independent expenditure: the 
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supporter running an independent ad may say the wrong thing or say 
it at the wrong time with the wrong images.79 Instead of conveying a 
lot of value, the expenditure conveys only a little.  
 This conventional account works in theory. To work in practice, 
the law must do a good job of sorting. Put differently, for coordination 
regulations to suppress the conveyance of value, expenditures de-
signed with “inside” information from campaigns must properly be 
classified as “coordinated” and therefore limited. Does the law 
properly sort? Consider again, briefly, the five situations in which an 
expenditure satisfies the conduct prong of the coordination test.80 The 
first arises when the expenditure is “created, produced, or distributed 
at the request or suggestion of a candidate.”81 The other four arise 
when a politician or someone else connected to a campaign directly 
provides information to an outsider who uses that information when 
crafting an ad.  
 These situations capture many expenditures designed with inside 
information, but they do not capture all. The rules permit outsiders 
to use any inside information that politicians make public. Outsiders 
can listen to candidates’ speeches; check their websites; read their 
Facebook posts; follow their Tweets;82 or use statements, strategies, 
images, or videos that politicians have made publicly available.83 This 
means that outsiders can, without coordinating, get much of the in-
formation they need to make their expenditures effective. This is 
                                                                                                                                       
independent expenditure is fraught with the risk of failure, or worse, in advancing the 
candidate’s prospects.”). We will show that the logic behind that assumption is not strong. 
 79. See, e.g., Lee Drutman, Five Takeaways from a New Campaign Finance Report, 
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 18, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/06/ 
18/new-soft-money/ (summarizing takeaways from a recent report, one of which being that 
campaigns “don’t like all the outside money,” as it sometimes causes candidates to lose 
control of their message or makes their campaign look “dumber and sillier”); James 
Hohmann & Burgess Everett, Weiland Escalates Feud with Reid, POLITICO (Oct. 31, 
2014, 11:56 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/rick-weiland-harry-reid-feud-
112375.html (noting that a Democratic Senate candidate said that the Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign Committee’s expenditures “hurt more than they helped”); Daniel 
Lippman, Year of the ‘Regular Folk’, POLITICO (Sept. 15, 2014, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/year-of-the-regular-folk-110912.html (observing that 
sometimes campaign ads backfire when the “average Joes” featured on the commercial are 
not properly vetted and embarrassing information is later revealed about them).  
 80. See supra Section II.B.  
 81. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(1) (2015); see also supra Section II.B. 
 82. See Briffault, supra note 9, at 94 (“Why do they have to meet when they can 
tweet?”).   
 83. See Shane Goldmacher, The Actual Intention Behind That Awkward Mitch 
McConnell Video, NAT’L J. (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/the-
actual-intention-behind-that-awkward-mitch-mcconnell-video-20140312.   
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what prompts observers to state that “there’s always coordination—
the media is the coordination,” which makes non-coordination a 
“farce.”84   
 To make this observation concrete, suppose that the value con-
veyed to a politician by political spending depends on the product  
of two numbers: the amount spent, and the Efficiency Factor, or “EF” 
for short. EF takes a value between -1 and 1, where higher values 
indicate greater efficiency.85 For contributions and coordinated ex-
penditures, which have maximal effect, EF equals 1. Thus, a contri-
bution of $2000 conveys $2000 in value. What about independent ex-
penditures? An outsider with little knowledge of a campaign’s needs 
and strategies may spend $2000 on a clunky, independent  
ad. That expenditure may have an EF of just 0.1, meaning it conveys 
only $200 in value, or even a negative EF, meaning it takes value 
from the candidate. Here the Supreme Court is right: the absence of 
coordination undermines the value of the expenditure, reducing the 
risk of corruption. But now suppose the outsider has a lot of 
knowledge, all acquired from public sources, of the campaign’s needs 
and strategies. The outsider spends $2000 on a helpful ad with an EF 
of 0.9, and the ad conveys $1800 in value. That independent ad, 
which the Court tells us by definition cannot corrupt, looks suspi-
ciously like a coordinated ad that can.  
 Much of the controversy over coordination reduces to a dispute 
about EF. Critics argue that outsiders can, without violating the  
regulations, collect enough information to run valuable ads.86 This 
means EF is large. We can understand reforms in the same terms. 
Proposals to broaden coordination rules by putting more distance  
between politicians and outsiders would make it harder for outsiders 
to acquire campaign information.87 This would reduce EF.  
                                                                                                                                       
 84. TOKAJI & STRAUSE, supra note 7, at 65.  
 85. To simplify, we assume that the maximum value an expenditure can convey to a 
politician is the face value of the money spent (in other words, EF cannot exceed 1). 
Likewise, we assume the most harm an expenditure can cause is the negative face value of 
the money spent (thus the smallest value of EF is -1). These assumptions keep the math 
simple without affecting the logic. 
 86. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 9, at 93-94 (One of the several reasons offered by 
Briffault is that “[c]andidates and committees don’t have to talk . . . they can communicate 
through the press.”); Cummings, supra note 57 (describing how a congressional committee 
publicly revealed its ad buy strategy, allowing independent groups to use the information 
to the candidates’ benefit without violating coordination rules).  
 87. The American Anti-Corruption Act, for example, would count as coordinated and 
therefore limit any expenditure that was crafted with input from a family member or 
former colleague of the politician. See THE AMERICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION ACT, pt. 2, 
provision 7, at 7-8 (2015), https://represent.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/AACA-Full-
Provisions.pdf (recommending that the FEC’s coordination regulations be revised). 
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 Suppose critics are right, EF is too large.88 This means the law 
classifies some expenditures that are effectively coordinated—they 
use campaign information and thus convey a lot of value to politi-
cians—as independent expenditures that do not and cannot corrupt. 
Can the law do better? Stricter coordination rules could further sepa-
rate outsiders and politicians, but practical and constitutional hur-
dles limit this possibility. Unless the law prohibits candidates from 
publicizing their platforms and strategies, and outsiders from paying 
attention, then outsiders will always have enough information to 
make expenditures that convey at least some value. Stricter rules 
might drop EF to 0.6 or 0.3, but they almost certainly cannot drop it 
below zero.89  
 This leads to a deep flaw in the coordination-rules-suppress-quids 
logic. Recall that the value conveyed by an expenditure equals  
the amount spent multiplied by EF. Reforms may shrink EF, but 
they cannot shrink the amount spent. Citizens United holds that  
independent expenditures cannot be capped.90 As a result, outsiders 
who want to convey value to politicians can always do so by simply 
spending more. Suppose a politician, as part of a corrupt exchange, 
demands $50,000 in value. If EF equals 0.9, the outsider can convey 
that amount by spending about $56,000 on independent ads.91 If EF 
equals 0.5, the outsider must spend $100,000. As long as EF exceeds 
zero—as long as independent expenditures benefit politicians, even if 
just a tiny amount—then outsiders can convey the value necessary 
for a corrupt transaction.92  
 EF almost certainly exceeds zero. The Supreme Court recognizes 
as much. In McCutcheon v. FEC,93 the Court stated the absence of 
coordination “undermines the value of the expenditure to the candi-
                                                                                                                                       
 88. We mean the EF of the average or typical expenditure is too large. For 
sophisticated outsiders, the EF associated with their expenditures might be very high, 
while for less sophisticated outsiders it might be relatively low.  
 89. EF might drop below zero for any given expenditure. However, we conceptualize 
EF as an average. The claim is not that, if EF exceeds zero, all independent expenditures 
convey value. Rather, the claim is that the average independent expenditure conveys value. 
 90. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356-61 (2010).  
 91. Cf. Brendan Fischer, What Corruption? McCutcheon Reveals Absurdity of  
Citizens United, PR WATCH (Apr. 3, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2014/04/ 
12438/mccutcheon (noting James Simons’ $5 million contribution to the super PAC 
supporting President Obama and stating, “Assuming just 5% of that total was of ‘value’ to 
Obama . . . it [would still result in] a $250,000 donation.”).  
 92. This assumes that outsiders have enough money, which the wealthiest and most 
sophisticated ones will. We return to this issue below. For now, we note an interesting 
point made by Brent Ferguson. He argues that “an outside group can probably raise more 
money if a candidate does the fundraising.” Ferguson, supra note 70, at 489. It follows that 
if candidates cannot assist outside groups with fundraising, at least some of those groups 
will lack the resources to convey value to politicians. 
 93. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
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date. . . . But probably not by 95 percent.”94 EF almost certainly will 
continue to exceed zero following any tightening of coordination 
rules. This means the law, now and always, sorts imperfectly. Some 
effectively coordinated ads will get treated as independent ads. Those 
ads, like contributions and coordinated expenditures, convey value 
and can serve as quids. In fact, because they are unlimited,  
they make better quids. 95  When EF equals just 0.1, an  
independent expenditure of $100,000—chump change in American 
politics96—conveys $10,000 in value, much more than any lawful  
contribution.97  
 One might respond that this argument goes too far. If coordination 
rules are somewhat effective and EF is small, then the rules provide 
some deterrent effect. If EF is 0.2, for example, conveying $1 million 
in value requires $5 million in expenditures. Many outsiders cannot 
afford such large amounts, or if they can, the quo they expect in  
return will not justify the expense. So while it may be true that, in 
theory, outsiders can convey value regardless of the (positive) value of 
EF, in practice they cannot or will not. It follows that coordination 
rules, even if they do not limit all valuable expenditures, limit some. 
Better to stop some corruption than none.98  
 The response is valid, but note two points. As EF grows, the objec-
tion dissipates. Even after a tightening of coordination rules, EF 
might be close to 1. More fundamentally, to make this argument is to 
concede an irony of coordination: the law focuses on the least harmful 
targets. Coordination regulations make it harder for relatively poor 
outsiders to engage in corruption. They make it harder for outsiders 
whose corrupt acts will not benefit them much. Such acts probably do 
                                                                                                                                       
 94. Id. at 1454 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  
 95. See Kang, supra note 5, at 30 (“When . . . independent expenditures can be made 
without restriction in very large amounts, the risk of corruption may even be greater than 
the risk from capped contributions.”). 
 96. During the 2012 presidential election, the super PACs Restore our Future and 
American Crossroads had spent over $142 million and $91 million, respectively, while 
Priorities USA Action had spent over $66 million. Independent Spending Totals,  
N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance/independent-expenditures/ 
totals (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). In 2012, Sheldon and Miriam Adelson gave $10 million 
to one super PAC, and in 2004, George Soros gave $23.7 million in total to several PACs. 
Will Oremus, The Biggest Political Donations of All Time, SLATE (Jan. 27, 2012, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/01/sheldon_adelson_newt_gin
grich_and_the_largest_campaign_donations_in_u_s_history_.html.  
 97. At the federal level in the 2013–2014 campaign cycle, contributions by individuals 
to candidates were limited to $2600 (adjusted for inflation). During the same cycle, 
contributions by multicandidate PACs were limited to $5000. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2)(A) 
(Supp. II 2014) (formerly codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2006)); FEC, CONTRIBUTIONS 2 
(2014), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contributions_brochure.pdf.  
 98. As Brad Smith observes, “[N]o system will address every potential source of 
corruption, and . . . a regulatory regime can be effective without being even close to 
perfect.” See Smith, supra note 44, at 609. 
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relatively little harm to society. Coordination regulations do not deter 
outsiders with lots of money from engaging in very lucrative—and 
presumably very harmful—corruption. 
B.   Coordination and Pros 
 Corruption, at least the kind modern campaign finance law focus-
es on, requires a bargain. Someone must convey value to a politician 
in exchange for a favor and vice versa. The bargain could be explicit, 
as when conspirators agree to terms over dinner, or implicit, as when 
a “wink or nod” closes the deal.99 Coordination limits can deter cor-
ruption by frustrating bargaining. The Supreme Court believes they 
do exactly this, or aspire to, and others have described the Court’s 
reasoning in that manner. Professor Brad Smith uses the term “coor-
dination” synonymously with “discussions and dealings between the 
parties.”100 Professor Larry Lessig explains the Court’s understanding 
of independent expenditures as follows: “There may be a quid. There 
may be a quo. But because the two are independent, there is no pro.”101 
 Do existing coordination rules frustrate bargaining? In theory, 
maybe a little, but in practice, almost certainly not. Recall, this time 
in reverse order, the situations in which an expenditure satisfies the 
conduct prong of the coordination test.102 The fifth and fourth situa-
tions arise when someone (not the politician) recently connected to a 
campaign provides information to an outsider that is material to that 
outsider’s ad or other expenditure. These situations have very little 
to do with bargaining.103 They do not prevent an outsider from hiring 
someone recently connected to a campaign—the kind of person who 
could negotiate a deal—nor do they prevent outsiders from talking 
directly to politicians. The third and second situations arise when the 
politician provides input on the contents or form of an expenditure. 
                                                                                                                                       
 99. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 221 (2003) (“[E]xpenditures made after a 
‘wink or nod’ often will be ‘as useful to the candidate as cash.’ ”), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). As stated above, supra Section 
II.B, “agreement or formal collaboration . . . is not required” to find coordination. 11  
C.F.R. § 109.21(e) (2015). See FEC, supra note 47, at 4. 
 100. See Smith, supra note 44, at 632. Smith uses this language to describe the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning, not necessarily his own.  
 101. Lawrence Lessig, Democracy After Citizens United, BOS. REV. (Sept. 4, 2010), 
http://bostonreview.net/lessig-democracy-after-citizens-united. We understand Lessig to be 
explaining the Supreme Court’s reasoning, not accepting it.  
 102. See supra Section II.B.  
 103. In fact, these situations have almost nothing at all to do with bargaining. These 
conduct prongs would only apply if the common vendor (prong 4) or former staffer (prong 5) 
conveyed information to the outside group that is “material to the creation, production, or 
distribution of the communication.” 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(4)(iii) (2015); see also 11 C.F.R.  
 109.21(d)(5)(ii) (2015) (same). The person can join the outside group, convey all sorts of 
“inside” information, and (illegally) negotiate a bargain with the candidate, all without 
violating these conduct prongs. 
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These situations cannot block much bargaining. For one thing, en-
forcement presents a challenge. Imagine a bad actor and a crooked 
politician prepared to engage in an illegal deal. All they need is a 
chance to bargain over details, like the exact contents of the ad that 
will serve as a quid. Will coordination rules cause them to pull back, 
or will they violate the rules under the safe assumption that not eve-
ry conversation gets monitored? We suspect the latter. But suppose 
we are wrong and would-be criminals, for whatever reason, respect 
this particular rule and do not discuss the substance of the quid. As 
far as the coordination rules are concerned, they can still bargain; 
they just cannot discuss the substance of the expenditure.  
 To illustrate, suppose an outsider and a politician agree to a  
corrupt exchange. The outsider gets a favorable vote on a bill, and 
the politician gets expenditures worth $100,000 to her. How can the 
outsider convey the $100,000? The parties could coordinate on the 
contents of an ad. The ad would have an EF of 1, or close to it, and 
the outsider could fulfill his end of the bargain by spending $100,000, 
or only slightly more. Of course, that ad would violate the limit on 
coordinated expenditures.104 Alternatively, the parties could not coor-
dinate on the contents of the ad. Instead, they could agree that the 
outsider would contribute money to a third-party group—say, a super 
PAC—that supports the candidate. 105 The super PAC need not know 
about the illegal exchange; the parties surely would prefer that it not. 
The higher the super PAC’s EF, the less the outsider would have to 
contribute to convey $100,000. This exchange, though illegal, would 
not violate the coordination rules.106 Even if perfectly enforced, the 
rules mentioned so far would not address this kind of bargaining. 
 However, we are left with the first prong, which arises when the 
expenditure is “created, produced, or distributed at the request or 
suggestion of the candidate.”107 Although the fifth, fourth, third, and 
second situations in which an expenditure becomes coordinated 
would not capture the scenario just described, the first one would. 
Nonetheless, the first prong also has limitations. Enforcement again 
                                                                                                                                       
 104. See supra Section II.A.  
 105. Professor Rick Hasen makes these arguments: “[U]nscrupulous donors and 
candidates could agree to a bribe, with the money going to a[n outside] group committed to 
doing everything to elect the candidate. That [group] need not even know about the 
bribe[.]” Hasen, supra note 68, at 7. Disclosure requirements can facilitate this kind of 
illegal bargaining. The politician can confirm that the outsider contributed the money as 
promised by checking the FEC’s website. See generally Michael D. Gilbert & Benjamin F. 
Aiken, Disclosure and Corruption, 14 ELECTION L.J. 148 (2015).  
 106. It may, however, violate solicitation rules. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 300.60-61 (2015); 
Advisory Opinion from Cynthia L. Bauerly, Chair, FEC, to Marc. E. Elias, Esq., Ezra W. 
Reese, Esq., and Jonathan S. Berkon, Esq., Perkins Coie LLP (June 30, 2011), 
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202011-12.pdf. We thank David Keating for pointing this 
out.  
 107. See supra Section II.B. 
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presents a challenge: can we monitor politicians’ utterances? Can we 
be sure Rothblatt and his parent, while barbequing in the family’s 
backyard, do not exchange a few words about expenditures? Setting 
that aside, bad actors could avoid this situation by not discussing ex-
penditures. In the example, the outsider and politician could agree to 
the corrupt exchange while leaving the nature of the quid open-
ended. Instead of agreeing to convey expenditures worth $100,000, 
they could agree that the outsider would convey $100,000 in value. 
The outsider could then opt to convey the value with expenditures. 
The coordination rules do not address this kind of corrupt bargaining.   
 Could tighter coordination rules make it harder for outsiders and 
politicians to bargain? Probably not, as practical and constitutional 
hurdles stand in the way. Bargaining proceeds through communica-
tion, and the First Amendment takes a dim view of limitations on 
communication. The law can forbid bargaining over expenditures and 
campaign strategy, but it cannot forbid discussions generally. Out-
siders, politicians, and their low-profile agents can talk on the phone, 
exchange emails or texts, chat on the subway, exchange a few words 
at a fundraiser, or meet for drinks in a private backyard. These are 
settings in which corrupt bargaining may take place, and these are 
modes of communication that the law probably cannot—and for polit-
ical reasons, almost certainly will not—reach.  
IV.   COORDINATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
 Recall that the constitutionality of campaign finance regulations 
turns on their potential to fight corruption. 108  Recall also that  
the regulations serve as prophylactics.109 They supplement bribery 
laws, not by punishing corruption but by stifling one or more of its 
necessary elements. This means that courts, in assessing the consti-
tutionality of such regulations, must consider their marginal effect on 
corruption. The question is not, how much corruption does the com-
bination of bribery laws and campaign finance regulations prevent? 
The question is, how much corruption does the combination prevent 
above and beyond bribery laws alone?  
 Answering this question requires an omniscience that we sadly 
lack. But we can, as courts do, make headway with intuitions. Exist-
ing coordination rules cannot stifle a lot of quids. As discussed, the 
rules allow outsiders to gather information about campaign needs 
and strategies from public sources. This means their expenditures, 
even without any campaign contact, can be effective (EF is positive). 
Effectiveness plus the ability to make unlimited independent expend-
itures means outsiders can convey value to politicians. Candidates 
                                                                                                                                       
 108. See supra Section II.A. 
 109. See supra Part II.  
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appreciate $1 million spent on somewhat useful (independent) ads, 
perhaps more than they appreciate smaller amounts spent on very 
useful (coordinated) ads.  
 Just as existing rules cannot suppress many quids, or many big 
ones, they cannot prevent much bargaining. As discussed, most of the 
provisions do not target bargaining, and bad actors can sidestep the 
provisions that do. They can bargain without discussing the details of 
an expenditure or without raising the possibility of an expenditure  
at all.  
 These intuitions suggest that existing coordination rules do not 
prevent much corruption, as bad actors can easily evade the limits. 
As a result, in the balance that determines the constitutionality of 
coordination rules, the weight on the “permissible” side of the scale 
may be light. Meanwhile, the weight on the “impermissible” side re-
mains the same as always. Some non-corrupt outside groups, hoping 
to exercise their First Amendment rights, would like to coordinate 
with politicians, and coordination limits stymie them. How to weigh 
these pros and cons? We do not believe the Constitution provides a 
clear answer. Our point is simply that the constitutional argument 
for existing coordination limits may be weaker than commonly sup-
posed. The problem is not that the limits chill a lot of speech (though 
they might), and the problem is not that coordinated expenditures do 
not corrupt (they might corrupt a lot). The problem is that the coor-
dination rules hardly deter.110  
 One might respond that this reasoning, whatever its implications 
for existing coordination limits, can be disarmed with stricter rules. 
Broader regulations that reclassify many independent expenditures 
as coordinated would do a better job of combating corruption, which 
would in turn strengthen the argument for their constitutionality. 
Suppose, for example, that the government adopted Professor 
Briffault’s proposal to classify as coordinated, and therefore limited, 
all expenditures by groups who focus their support on only one can-
didate or a very small number of candidates and who have tight  
links to the candidate(s).111 To spend freely, groups would have to 
support more candidates and loosen their ties to them—no more  
former campaign managers on the super PAC staff. This might  
reduce the effectiveness of the group’s expenditures. Rather than  
relying on the former campaign manager’s insights about the politi-
cian’s needs, the group would have to resort to public sources. Of 
                                                                                                                                       
 110. Recall that our analysis focuses on actual corruption. We briefly address the 
appearance of corruption below. 
 111. Briffault, supra note 9, at 97-100. Again, we do not describe the proposal in full, 
and interested readers should consult Professor Briffault’s paper. 
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course, those sources are plentiful and easily accessible, so perhaps 
their effectiveness would not suffer much. EF may dwindle, but only 
by a little.  
 Rather than focusing on ties, one might focus on numbers. Requir-
ing a group to support multiple candidates might make it harder to 
convey value. Giving $50,000 to a super PAC that supports one can-
didate benefits that candidate, or is likely to, in a way that giving the 
money to a super PAC that supports dozens of candidates may not.112 
But this reasoning has a limit, too. If a politician sees an uptick in 
support from a group following a contribution to that group, he or she 
may reasonably infer that the support traces to the contributor.113 
Even if not, this problem resolves with the usual antidote: more mon-
ey. A politician who seeks $50,000 in value from a corrupt actor may 
not be satisfied by a contribution of $100,000 to a group that supports 
him and many other candidates. He might, however, be satisfied by a 
contribution of $500,000.    
 Dilemmas like these will infect any reform proposal that targets 
quids. As discussed, unless the government prevents politicians from 
broadcasting information, and outsiders from listening, those outsid-
ers, or at least the wealthy ones capable of causing the greatest social 
harm, will have what they need to convey value. Stricter coordination 
rules cannot do much to suppress bargains either. No plausible, con-
stitutional set of rules will prevent outsiders and politicians from 
conversing.  
 This suggests that the constitutional case for stricter coordination 
rules may not be so strong. Such rules cannot frustrate bargaining, 
and though they might make it harder to convey value, that effect, 
given the workarounds, could be small. Meanwhile, stricter rules 
would chill more speech. Depending on the magnitudes of these ef-
fects (and the weights one gives them on the First Amendment bal-
ance) the constitutional case for stricter rules might be weaker than 
that for existing rules. 
 The preceding arguments may look different if we shift focus from 
actual corruption to the appearance of corruption. Recall that states 
have an interest in preventing quid pro quos and the appearance  
of quid pro quos.114 Given the widespread dissatisfaction with the  
existing coordination rules, we doubt that they reduce the appear-
                                                                                                                                       
 112. See id. at 97 (“If an organization is involved in multiple election contests, then 
donations to the organization cannot be said to go to the aid of a specific candidate. In that 
case . . . the link between a particular donor and a particular candidate is attenuated.”). 
 113. Suppose, for example, that a group was required to support at least ten 
candidates. A donor could give the group $100,000, and the group could then spend $1000 
supporting each of the first nine candidates, saving the remaining $91,000 for the tenth 
candidate. 
 114. See supra Section II.A. 
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ance of corruption in a meaningful way. If we are wrong, then the 
constitutional case for such rules is stronger than we have suggested. 
Similarly, if new, stricter coordination rules would reduce the ap-
pearance of corruption, then the constitutional case for those rules 
would also grow stronger. 
 Before carrying these ideas too far, however, consider the mecha-
nisms through which coordination rules might improve appearances. 
One possibility is that the appearance of corruption correlates with 
actual corruption, so that as actual corruption declines appearances 
improve and vice versa. If that is the mechanism, and given the 
doubts expressed above about the ability of coordination rules to 
dampen corruption, we are skeptical that coordination rules, however 
strict, can improve appearances in a meaningful way.115 Another pos-
sible mechanism is more instinctual: politics just seems less corrupt 
with coordination rules in place. If that is the mechanism, then 
things get complicated—and possibly paradoxical. If coordination 
rules improve the appearance of corruption, and if improving appear-
ances reduces vigilance and enforcement, then coordination rules can 
improve appearances while making actual corruption worse.116 
V.   CONCLUSION: COORDINATION AS THE WRONG PATH 
 The foregoing analysis does not square with Supreme Court  
doctrine. Since Buckley, the Court has made clear that Congress  
can limit coordinated expenditures.117  Consequently, there must be a 
way to define “coordinated” in a constitutional way. Likewise, there 
must be a way to distinguish “independent” expenditures, which the 
government cannot limit, from the rest. But the Court has never 
tried to do this work, perhaps because the challenge is too great.  
 Consider the Court’s declaration in Citizens United: 
“[I]ndependent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption,” 118 
where corruption means quid pro quos. The term “independent”  
                                                                                                                                       
 115. For the possibility that an improved appearance of corruption might reduce actual 
corruption as the result of a “beneficial self-fulfilling prophecy,” see Adam M. Samaha, 
Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1609-10 (2012) (“[T]he 
chance of a beneficial self-fulfilling prophecy counterbalances concerns about regulatory 
efficacy. . . . [A] favorable appearance would pull reality toward lower actual corruption 
levels.”). For that to be the case in this setting, coordination regulations would first have to 
improve the appearance of corruption. 
 116. This point relates to one developed by Gilbert and a coauthor in a separate paper. 
See Gilbert & Aiken, supra note 105 (suggesting laws requiring disclosure of campaign 
finance information can improve the appearance of corruption while worsening actual 
corruption).  
 117. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-47, 78 (1976) (per curiam); FEC v. Colo. 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 447 (2001); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 
93, 202-03, 219-23 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 118. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.  
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cannot mean “non-corrupt,” or the reasoning becomes tautological. 
Instead, independent must mean an expenditure that does not  
convey a quid, involve a pro, or both.119 Now the logic works, but the 
operational problem looms. The law cannot sort expenditures into the 
“independent” category based on whether the spender and politician 
actually bargained. We almost never know if they bargained, and if 
we know they did, then the government can prosecute them under 
bribery laws, rendering proper categorization of the expenditure 
moot.120 Likewise, the law cannot sort them on the basis of whether 
there was an opportunity to bargain. While discussing the contents of 
an expenditure, an outsider and politician have an opportunity  
to bargain illegally. But that opportunity is one of many; they can 
bargain illegally just about any time. Expenditures that come after 
x+1 bargaining opportunities cannot raise significantly greater cor-
ruption concerns than expenditures that come after x bargaining op-
portunities when x is a half-dozen, twenty, or a hundred.  
 To see the depth of the problem in another way, consider what it 
would take for coordination rules targeting corrupt bargaining to 
serve as a prophylactic, that is, to deter corrupt bargaining that 
would not be deterred by bribery laws alone. An outsider and a politi-
cian would have to be prepared to negotiate a quid pro quo in viola-
tion of bribery laws but not prepared to discuss details of an expendi-
ture in violation of coordination limits.121 
                                                                                                                                       
 119. It could also mean an expenditure that does not involve a quo but, as discussed, 
that does not work in practice or seem to be the target of the law.  
 120. Federal bribery law only requires an offer of a favor. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (2012).  
 121. If a violation of coordination rules were easier for the government to detect than 
bribery, or carried a severer sanction, or both, then an outsider and politician might behave 
as the sentence states. Perhaps these conditions could be satisfied, but it is hard to see 
how. The government can prosecute a person for bribery if they simply offer illegal favors. 
18 U.S.C. § 201(b). We see no reason to believe that observing a conversation about 
coordination could be easier than observing a conversation involving an offer of illegal 
favors. Likewise, the sanction for coordination violations probably will not exceed the 
sanction for bribery. The sanction for bribery may include imprisonment for up to fifteen 
years, a fine the greater of three times the value of the bribe or the statutory maximum of 
$250,000, or both. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b); Public Corruption, 51 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1549, 
1564-65 (2014). For coordination violations, civil penalties shall not exceed the greater of 
$7500 or the amount of the contribution or expenditure in question, or the greater of 
$16,000 or 200% of the amount involved for knowing and willful violations. See 11  
C.F.R. § 111.24(a) (2015). Criminal sanctions for coordination violations are only 
appropriate if the violations were committed “knowingly and willfully,” and such sanctions 
may include prison sentences. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d) (Supp. II 2014) (formerly codified at 
2 U.S.C. § 437g (2012)); Election Law Violations, 51 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 963, 979 (2014). 
However, the sanction for coordination violations is usually derived through a conciliation 
process, see 11 C.F.R. § 111.18 (2015), and most often leads to civil penalties, see Quick 
Answers to Compliance Questions, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_compliance. 
shtml#penalties (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). Punishment for coordination violations is “up 
to the six-member FEC – split evenly between Republicans and Democrats . . . .” Rachael 
Marcus & John Dunbar, Rules Against Coordination Between Super PACs, Candidates, 
Tough to Enforce, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), 
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 The law also performs poorly when sorting expenditures into the 
independent category by focusing on value. Here there are two choic-
es: focus on EF, or focus on amount spent. By definition, coordination 
focuses on EF, which creates the problems discussed. Even broad  
definitions of coordination will not keep outsiders from gathering 
what they need, and this plus unlimited spending means they can 
reliably convey value. This dilemma presumably worsens as technol-
ogies change and politicians get better at publicizing, and outsiders 
at absorbing, key information.  
 One might respond that we have misdiagnosed the problem. The 
trouble is not with coordination rules per se but with coordination 
rules in a world where the only relevant form of corruption is quid 
pro quo corruption. Perhaps such rules would make more sense if the 
government had an interest in combating quid pro quos and also “the 
broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large 
contributors.”122 That was the state of the law before the Roberts 
Court. But we do not believe this is right. However corruption is  
defined, it presumably worsens when individuals can convey value to 
politicians and meet with them or their representatives for quiet con-
versations. As explained, coordination rules can do little to prevent 
these activities, at least when wealthy and sophisticated actors are 
involved. The flaws with coordination do not depend on particular 
definitions of corruption.  
 Perhaps all of these observations, troubling though they may be, 
just support the usual maxim that rules are under and over-
inclusive. We have shown that coordination rules cannot capture 
some behaviors they should (corrupt speech) and capture others they 
should not (non-corrupt speech). Those deficiencies reduce but do not 
eliminate the value of the rules: surely they stop some corruption.  
 They probably do stop some corruption, but we have shown that 
they stop less—perhaps substantially less—than one might think. 
This does not mean coordination rules should be abandoned. But it 
does mean that their under-inclusiveness is worse than commonly 
supposed.  
 We should not assume that the Supreme Court, when it drew the 
line between coordinated and independent expenditures, understood 
the deficiencies with the coordination framework. Nor should we  
assume that the Court, had it understood the deficiencies, would 
nevertheless have drawn the line it did. Perhaps the Court, had it 
considered all of the above, would have concluded that the independ-
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/01/13/7866/rules-against-coordination-between-super-
pacs-candidates-tough-enforce. 
 122. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (articulating this 
broader conception of corruption and tracing it to Buckley).  
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ent/coordinated distinction led down the wrong path, one that could 
not reduce corruption by much, and therefore made the constitutional 
structure unsound. Perhaps the Court would have selected the other 
choice, ignoring EF and permitting the government to limit the 
amount one could spend, whether that spending was in some sense 
coordinated or not. That may have chilled more speech, but it would 
have related much more logically to the problem of corruption. 
 
